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Soviet Theory of the Legal Nature
of Customary International Law

N MUNICIPAL LAW' custom is an important source of law
for the Soviet state, but this fact has not disposed the USSR to
embrace it enthusiastically. John Hazard has observed that:
Customary law was applied under the Imperial regime to
relations among the peasants.
As has been indicated earlier, more than
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A village "comradely" court of peasants settles such matters, and
cases have been reported in which the question in issue was
whether a family was a peasant family or a worker's family
living in a village. The latter would be subject to the civil
code's provisions concerning the ownership of property and not
to peasant custom. In spite of this situation, Soviet text writers
are very cautious in viewing custom as a source of law.2
Soviet writers approach customary international law with equal
caution. Although traces of customary law were implicit in the actions of the Soviet state from the very beginning, Soviet spokesmen at first refused to recognize custom as a primary source of
law, placing reliance solely upon treaty law.3 But ever since
Evgenii B. Pashukanis' penetrating question in 1935, "Why should
I The term "municipal law" refers to the domestic or internal law of a nationstate.
2 J. Hazard, The Future Codification in the USSR, 29 TUL. L. REV. 239, 243244 (1955).
3 See R. ERICKSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE REVOLUTIONARY State (1972);

J.

TRISKA & R. SLUSSER, THE THEORY, LAW AND POLICY OF SOVIET TREATIES (1962).

4 Evgenii B. Pashukanis, Soviet educator and practitioner of international law,
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the Soviet Government be deprived of those rights which require
no treaty formation and derive from the very fact that normal
diplomatic relations exist?", the Soviet Union has openly accepted
custom as a primary source of international law.5
Today, Soviet scholars are in general accord that treaty and custom are the only primary sources of international law, although
treaty is emphasized as the more important source. 6 Grigorii I.
Tunkin, Chief Legal Advisor to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, has
conceded, "Nobody has ever contested that there are customary
norms of international law." 7 He has further stated, "It is also indisputable that many of the rules of international law are rules
.of custom." 8
Even more revealing is Tunkin's statement,
["D]aily observation manifests the considerable role in international law of customary norms; states constantly refer to them in
their inter-state relations."9
Notwithstanding Soviet acceptance of customary international
law in the 1930's, a clear statement of its actual legal nature was not
forthcoming until the post-Stalin period.Io It was at this time that
was from 1930 until his disappearance in 1937 editor of the leading official law
journal Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Revoliutsiia Pravu [Soviet State and Revolution-

ary Law]. In 1936 he was appointed Vice-Commissar of Justice, but shortly thereafter became a target of criticism during the purges. He was labled an "enemy of
the people" and presumably executed.
I E.

Pashukanis,

OCHERKI

MEZHDUNARODOMU

PO

PRAVU

(Essays

on Interna-

tional Law), ch. 2 (Moscow, 1935).
6 See F.

Kozhevnikov,

U.N.

YEARBOOK

OF THE INTERNATIONAL

LAW COMMIS-

SION, A/CN.4/SR237/46 (August 11, 1953) at 367; S. Krylov, U.N. YEARBOOK OF
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION,
A/CN.4/SR378/189 (June 29, 1956) at
278; and Akademiia Nauk SSSR, Institut Prava, INTERNATIONAL LAW 12. See
western writers on the Soviet position: C. DeVisschcr, THEORY AND REALITY IN
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 163 (1957); and Triska and Slusser, supra note 3, at
9-31.
7 G. Tunkin, Coexistence and International Law, 95 RECUEIL DES COURS (Collected Lectures) 9 (1958).

8 G., Tunkin, Forty Years of Coexistence and International Law, 1958 SOVETSKII
EZHEGODNIK

MEZHDUNARODNOGO

PRAVA

[Soviet Yearbook

of International

Law]

42 (1958).
9 G.

TUNKIN,

DROIT

INTERNATIONAL

PUBLIC

[Public

International

Law]

76

(Paris 1965). It is doubtful whether Tunkin would go so far as to agree with his
Polish colleague Karol Wolfke that, "Premature it seems is the recently expressed
opinion that, as a result of the accelerated tempo and growing complexity of international law, customary law is rapidly losing its imortance. Customary law being
more elastic and best adaptable to new conditions and needs is evolving with the
evolution of international life."

K. WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LAW

9-10 (Mroclaw 1964).
10 A discussion of the post-Stalin shift in focus from ideological questions of
reconciling Marxism and customary law to pragmatic questions as to the legal nature of custom may be found in ERICKSON, supra note 3, at ch. I.
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Tunkin called for less dogmatism and more pragmatism, for a con-'
centrated effort to deal with real world problems rather than ideological generalities. Prior to 1953, books and articles devoted to a
legal analysis of custom were virtually unknown. After 1953, such
writings began to appear with increasing regularity."
Soviet
writers began posing such questions as: What is customary international law? How is customary law created? When ought a customary norm cease to be binding? The significance of this development cannot be over-emphasized. It marked a shifting of focus
away from ideological analysis of the class nature of customary law.
Instead, Soviet scholars would begin to contribute to the body of
legal thought concerning international custom.
CUSTOM VERSUS TREATY IN THE SOVIET VIEW
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The Soviet Union recognizes custom together with treaty as the
only primary sources of international law. Yet Soviet writers carefully and consistently stress treaty law as the more important of the
two. This valuation of custom may at least partially be explained
in terms of the combined influences of Soviet ideology and pragmatic foreign policy considerations.
Soviet ideology attributes to customary international law a
"bourgeois character." 12 Insofar as it is perceived as evolving from
the practice of capitalist states, ancient custom is suspect as serving
primarily capitalist interests. A Soviet law text observes, "Exaggeration of the importance of international custom . . . is in line
with the policy of certain imperialist circles, a policy of violating
treaty obligations and giving legal form to illegal international

n See P. LUNKIN, ISTOCHNIKI MEZHDUNARODNOGO PRAVA [Sources of International Law] (Moscow 1960); N. MINASIAN, ISTOCHNIKI SOVREMENOGO MEZHDUNARODNOGO PRAVA [Sources of Contemporary International Law] (Rostov on Don
1960); N. MINASIAN, PRAVO MIRNOGO SOSUSHCHESTVOVANIIA [The Law of Peaceful Coexistence] (Rostov on Don 1966); G. TUNKIN, VOPROsY TEORII MEZHDU'NARODNOGO PRAVA [Theoretical Questions of International Law] (Moscow 1962);
and Tunkin, Remarks on the Judicial Nature of Customary Norms of International Law,
49 CALIF. L. REV. 419-430 (1961).
12 For a depreciation of custom by Soviet writers, see: Tunkin, Remarks on the
Judicial Nature of Customary Norms of International Law, supra note 11, at 428-429;
Talalayev and Boyarshinov, Unequal Treaties as a Form of Subjugation to Colonial Dependency of the New States of Asia, 1961 SOVETSKII EZHEGODNIK MEZHDUNARODNOGO

PRAVA [Soviet Yearbook of International Law] 156 (1961); and Zakharova, Bilateral Treaties of Friendship, Collaboration, and Cooperation Among Socialist States, 2
SovETsKoE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO [Soviet State and Law] 80 (1962).

1975]

SOVIET THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

practices under the label of 'international custom.'

"13

As long as

the Soviet Union continues to view custom as composed chiefly of
norms created prior to the Great October Revolution, a certain
aloofness from customary international law is to be expected on
ideological grounds.
The fact that many international legal customs antedate the
creation of the Soviet state may also give rise to dissatisfaction with
customary law on the more pragmatic level of policy-making. Legal norms delineate what is proper and what is improper in the
interaction of states. There must exist a certain uneasiness among
Soviet practitioners at having their conduct circumscribed by a body
of customary law which they had no part in developing. This is not
a feeling unique to the Soviets. The new nations of the Third World
have expressed similar dissatisfactions.
On the other hand, Soviet scholars have come to argue that a
series of new and progressive customary norms, such as peaceful
coexsistence, national self-determination, and disfavor of unequal
treaties, have been introduced into international law at Soviet insistence. 14 As a result, Soviet perceptions of the "bourgeois character" of custom may be weakening somewhat, and the USSR may
presently feel that customary international law bears a recognizable
Soviet imprimatur.
A final reason for Soviet disfavor of custom may lie with the
unwritten nature of customary law. In Soviet eyes, unwritten law
is uncertain law as to principles and their meaning. Such qualities
run counter to the Soviet belief that relations with opposing social
systems ought to be developed strictly upon the basis of negotiations and agreements."' As the USSR grows in strength and
acquires a greater sense of security in dealing with non-communist
states, it is possible that Soviets may be willing to accept more uncertainty and make greater use of legal custom.
For the present, Soviets have tended to rely on custom only if a
treaty source cannot be located and only if there exists a felt need to
cite an authoritative source of law. But although treaties are re13Academiya Nauk SSSR, Institut Prava, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 6, at
12. The normal predilection of lawyers for precedent becomes a "bourgeois deviation" if it involves reference to bourgeois writers, bourgeois legislation, or bourgeois norms in such a way as to point up their superiority to that of socialist
writers, socialist legislation, or socialist norms (an ideological problem).
11 See D.

Levin,

OSNOVNYE PROBLEMY

SOVREMENNOGO MEZHDUNARODNOGO

[Basic Problems of Contemporary International
Tunkin, supra note 8, at 35.
15See DeVisscher, supra note 6, at 163.

Law] 11 (Moscow

PRAVA

1958); and
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lied upon in preference to custom, in the absence of a treaty custom
serves the valuable function of providing an authoritative legal
source. Occasionally, however, Soviet practitioners will refrain
from identifying the specific source of a given principle of international law or will obscure the source in ambiguous language. Two
forms of such ambiguity are discernible. The first is simply to
claim that a norm has acquired binding force because it is a "general principle" of law. Since Soviet lawyers refuse to recognize
"general principles" as an independent source of international law,
and since they hold that "general principles" can acquire binding
force of law only if incorporated through treaty or custom, it is ambiguous merely to identify a source of law as a "general principle"
without further specifying whether it was embodied through either
treaty or custom. A second sort of ambiguity occurs when Soviet
scholars assert that a legal rule has its source in the United Nations
Charter. Since the Soviets hold that the UN Charter may give rise
to treaty as well as customary law, withotit further clarification the
actual source of the rule remains clouded.16
Generally speaking, the task of the Soviet lawyer is to state
specifically how a customary norm is created and in what manner
it ceases to be binding. By asserting guidelines Soviet attorneys
set forth the standard by which they will judge the process of customary law-making. No doubt the interplay of international politics will confine Soviet interpretation of this process within certain
limits. Nonetheless, the Soviet lawyer may be expected to claim
some latitude for his Foreign Ministry in deciding on the crucial
factors necessary for the creation or termination of a customary
norm of international law. Tunkin realized the significance of this
task when he observed:
There may hardly be any doubt that the problem of customary
international law is one of the most difficult of all the problems
of international law. It is also one of the most important. Upon
the solution of this problem [how custom is created and terminated] depends to a very great extent the whole concept of
international

law.17

1PRACTICE AS AN INDICATION OF CUSTOM
"Customary norms of international law grow out of internation16The question of the United Nations Charter as a source of customary law
could easily be the subject of another separate and extensive article.
17Tunkin, supra note 7, at 9.
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al practice," Tunkin told those assembled for his 1958 Hague
Academy Lectures.1 8 The practice of states may consist of their
either taking or abstaining from action in a given situation. "As a
rule," Tunkin notes, "it is much easier, of course, to establish the
existence of a customary norm of international law in the presence
of positive action by states, but there is no reason to deny the possibility of a customary norm of international law being established
by the practice of abstinence from action."19
Chief among the positive acts of states which have resulted in
customary norms of international law are diplomatic practices.
Certain prescribed actions are expected to be performed by states
with respect to diplomatic officers as a matter of law. 2° The abstinence from action, or rather the negative actions of states undoubtedly may lead to the creation of a rule of conduct that may
also become a judicial norm. 21 Tunkin writes:
It should be pointed out that many principles and norms of
international law involve, in one measure or another, commitments on the part of states to refrain from certain actions in
their relations with other states. Thus, the respect-of-sovereignty principle commits states to refrain from any action constituting a violation of the sovereignty of another state. In
accordance with the principle of non-intervention in the internal
affairs of another member of the international community, every
state is obliged to abstain from any action constituting interference in the internal affairs of another state. Even the open
seas principle, for instance, involves an obligation of a negative
character, which is that states must abstain from any action
likely to injure the "interests of other states in their exercise of
the freedom of the high seas." (Convention on the High Seas,
Article 2, A/CONF. 13/L.35/1958, A/CONF. 13/38, Vol. 1I).
Could these customary norms of international law appear if we
were to deny that the practice of abstinence can also lead to the
creation of a customary norm of international law?22
Western scholars are in general accord with their Soviet counter18Id.

See also Tunkin, Remarks on the Judicial Nature of Customary Norms of In-

ternational Law, supra note 11, at 419.
19 Tunkin, Remarks on the Judicial Nature of Customary Norms of International Law,
supra note 11, at 421.
2 It is recognized that the United Nations Convention on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities has weakened this example.
21 Tunkin, Remarks on the Judicial Nature of Customary Norms of International Law,
supra note 11, at 421. See also Tunkin, supra note 7, at 11-12.
22 Tunkin, supra note 11, at 422. Implicit in these words of Tunkin is that sovereignty, non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states, and freedom of

the high seas are, in whole or in part, customary norms.
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parts. Wheaton, Brierly, Rousseau, and Kunz agree that "customary international law is the generalization of the practice of
states. '"I" Several western writers have, however, called attention
to an ambiguity of terms and a confusion of logic. Hans Kelsen
has forthrightly declared the term "custom" to be equivocal, since it
denotes at one and the same time the factual situation creating a
rule and the rule itself created by that factual situation, hence the
term "customary rule." 24 This confusion notwithstanding, Soviet
and western scholars are agreed that practice, whether of a positive
or abstaining variety, is an indicator of custom.
THE SOVIET VIEW OF TIME, REPETITION,
AND CONTINUITY AS FACTORS
IN CUSTOMARY LAW
According to the Soviet view, duration, or the time element, is
important in the process whereby the positive or negative actions of
states are converted into customary law. "However, the element
of time does not in itself create a presumption in favour of a customary norm of international law." 5 A norm can be created almost
instantaneously as in the practice of sending satellites into cosmic
space over the territories of other states. Expressing the Soviet
viewpoint, Karol Wolfke, a Polish international lawyer, writes,
"The fact that the Soviet Union and the United States mutually
tolerate such practice and do not raise objections against such
flights for peaceful purposes over their territories, and that other
states, who do not as yet participate in this practice, have not protested, justifies the conclusion that [a customary principle has
evolved, because] states do not consider such flights as infringing
their sovereignty and even that sovereignty does not extend into
outer space."26

Moreover, Tunkin notes, "There is even less ground to think
23

Fisheries Case [1951] I.C.J. 191. See also Keith (ed.), 2 Wheaton's Elements

of International Law' 10 (6th ed. 1929); J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 59-60 (6th
ed. 1964); C. ROUSSEAU, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 64 (Paris 1953); and Kunz,
The Nature of Customary International Law, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 666 (1953).
24 H. Kelsen, Theorie du Droit International Coutumier [The Theory of Customary International Law], 1 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE LA TH9ORIE DU DROIT 262
(1939).
25 Tunkin, Remarks on the Judicial Nature of Customary Norms of International Law,
supra note 11, at 419-420 (emphasis supplied).
26 WOLFKE, supra note 9, at 64. It is recognized that the Outer Space Treaty has
weakened this example.
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that juridicially it is necessary for a customary rule to be 'old' or of
long standing."2
The description of a rule as "old" may mean
one of two things: either that the given rule, having long been observed in international practice, has passed the test of time, or
that "this very characteristic may give rise to some doubts as to
whether a rule of such an ancient origin corresponds to the present
circumstances.' '28
The element of repetition constitutes for the Soviet scholar
another factor in the formation of custom; it is the reiterated actions
of states with the passage of time. Tunkin believes that "In the majority of cases it is precisely the repetition of certain actions in
analgous situations that leads to such practices becoming a rule of
conduct." 29 But not every repetition of a particular action creates
a customary norm of international law. The "habit of doing certain actions may not result in forming a norm of conduct, and if a
norm of conduct has been formed this norm may not necessarily be
a legal norm. This may be a norm of international morality or a
norm of comitas gentium [international comity or courtesy]." 30 In
ambassadorial law there are many practices of long standing, repeated daily, which are not norms of international law; for example the exemption of baggage from customs. It is also conceivable, though such instances are rare, for a customary rule to result
from a single precedent without repetition. 31
Continuity is a third element important in the development of
custom. Soviet writers reject the view that "international practice
leading to the formation of a customary rule must have been con27 Tunkin, Remarks on the Judicial Nature of Customary Norms of International Law,

supra note 11, at 419. It is interesting to note that on this point Tunkin cites in his
article, supra note 7, at 9-10, two western authorities for his position: Basadevant,
Regles Gjnrales du Droit de la Paix [General Rules of the Law of Peace], 58
RECUEIL DES CouRs 518 (1936); and Kunz, supra note 23, at 666.
28Tunkin, supra note 7, at 10.
21 Tunkin, Remarks on the Judicial Nature of Customary Norms of International Law,
supra note 11, at 419.
31 Tunkin, supra note 7, at 10. Tunkin makes the same distinction between "custom" and "usage" as do his western colleagues. He writes, "but it is generally accepted and with good practice that 'custom in its legal sense means something more
than mere habit or usage' (James Brierly, The Law of Nations, 1955, p. 60)." Id. at

12. Other western writers cited to support his view were: A.

VENDROSS, V6LKER-

RECHT [International Law] 119 (Wien 1955); and Kunz, supra note 23, at 667.
31 This writer was unable to find an example given by a Soviet writer of a
customary norm created by a single precedent. It may be presumed that the launching of Sputniki I created a customary norm concerning the passage of satellites
over the territory of foreign states in a single act.
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tinued and repeated without interruption of continuity."32 This view
is untenable, for according to Tunkin, "no rule of international law
has ever been created by practice without interruption of continuity."

33

This does not mean that an interruption in international

practice has no effect upon the formation of a customary rule of
conduct. "Discontinuity," Tunkin adds, "may destroy a customary norm which is still in the process of formation; it all depends on
what character the discontinuity assumes." 34
In the Soviet view, the three dimensions of custom discussed
above; time, repetition, and continuity, do not play a decisive role
in the formation of a norm of international law, either individually
or together. 35 Each dimension may be necessary for the creation of a
customary norm, but none of them is alone sufficient. It is not possible
to speak of agreement between western and Soviet writers as to
the importance of time, repetition, and continuity because western
writers do not agree among themselves. 36 Western thinking on
this subject is in a transitional state. The traditional view seems to
have been that the development of customary international law is a
very slow process. However, the rapidity with which event follows event in contemporary international relations has led to a reevaluation of this position. For western scholars, then, there exists some confusion over the nature of custom.
AGREEMENT AS THE DECISIVE FACTOR IN THE
SOVIET VIEW OF CUSTOM
A Soviet law review article states, "Practices, even if long
standing, are not in themselves norms of international law. They
merely mark some particular state in the process of formation of
32Tunkin, supra note 7, at 10. Among the western scholars who hold this view
as cited by Tunkin are: Cavaglieri, Regles Generales du Droit de Paix [General
Rules of the Law of Peace], 26 RECUEIL DES COURs 315, 336-337 (1929); and
G. MORELLI, NozIONII Di DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE [Elements of International
18 (3d ed. 1951).

Law]
33

Id.

34 Tunkin, Remarks on the Judicial Nature of Customary Norms of International Law,
supra note 11, at 420-421.
35 Id. at 421. See also Tunkin, supra note 7, at 11.
36 See BRIERLY, supra note 23, at 62-63; DEVISSCHER, supra note 6, at 149;
G. HACKWORTH, 1 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1940); M. SORENSEN, LES
SOURCES Du DROIT INTERNATIONAL [The Sources of International Law] 98

(Copenhagen 1946); Kunz, supra note 23, at 666; Lauterpacht, Sovereignty Over Submarine Areas, 33 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 120-121 (1957).
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such a norm.''37 Within the Soviet viewpoint, international practices constitute what might be described as the raw material of custom, but it is the element of acceptance which gives practice the
mark of law. The essential element in this process "consists of
agreement among states. ' ' 38 "It is precisely in this sense, in our
opinion," writes Tunkin, "that one must understand subsection (b)
of section 1, Article 38 of the Statute of the World Court, 39 under
which one of the sources of international law is 'international custom as evidence of general practice accepted as law.'"4
For Soviet writers, there can be no norms of international law without
agreement between states.
Karol Wolfke has summarized the
Soviet position in this way:
One may risk saying that in present international law there
are no precise pre-established conditions for custom-creating
practices, except the one general condition that it must give
sufficient foundation for the presumption that the state concerned accepted it as binding.41

How is "agreement" reached among states? To Tunkin, "agreement, as to the means of creating norms of contemporary international law, is the result of the coordination of wills of different
states, which in fact are the wills of their ruling classes. '"42 The
process of reaching agreement on international norms was described by Tunkin in the following manner:
3 Tunkin, The United Nations 1945-1955 (Problems of International Law), 4
LAW AND GOVERNMENT

SOVIET

7 (1966).

38Tunkin, Remarks on the Judicial Nature of Customary Norms of International Law,
supra note 11, at 423. See also N. MINASIAN, supra note 11.
3"The

full

text of Article 38 of the

STATUTES OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF

(also referred to as the Statutes of the World Court) reads as follows:
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the consenting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various
nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide
a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto.
10 Tunkin, supra note 37, at 7. For a full discussion, see Tunkin, supra note 11,
at 419-430.
41 WOLFKE, supra note 9, at 51.

JUSTICE

42

TUNKIN,

OSNOVY

SOVREMENNOGO

MEZHDUNARODNOGO

Contemporary International Law] 4 (Moscow 1956).

PRAVA

[Principles of
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First, the process of concluding international treaties. In the
modern conditions of the coexsistence of states belonging to different social systems, the process of conclusion of general international treaties shows that we have a collision of different
positions on problems of international law, a collision of wills of
states. Then we witness the process of coordinating those
wills by negotiation. The result of this process, fixed by
treaty, is usually more or less different from what each particular
state has originally suggested. In the process of creating customary norms of international law there are no negotiations as
such, but as we have shown previously, the essence of this process consists also in framing an agreement between states on the
question of recognizing or accepting this or that norm of international law. This agreement is reached not by way of formal
negotiations connegotiations, but by, figuratively speaking,
43
ducted in the language of fact and action.
"Coordination of wills" of states does not entail merger into
some kind of "common will," "general will," or "single will" in the
process of creating customary norms of international law. For
Soviet writers, the "wills" of states cannot fuse because the aims
of states belonging to diverse socio-economic systems, a reflection
of their class interests, are different and even antagonistic. However, the "wills" of socialist and capitalist states can be "coordinated" so as to establish a definite rule of conduct. "A norm of
general international law is an expression not of a 'single will' but
of 'coordinated wills,' i.e., wills equally directed toward a definite
aim - recognition of a given rule as a norm of international law."44
How is this "coordination of wills" to be achieved? In the
Soviet view, agreements between states promote a mutual conditioning of "wills," the substance of which is the readiness of one
state to recognize a particular rule as a norm of international law
on the condition that the other state display a like readiness. This
"interconditionality" is the thread which links the wills of different
states within the process of developing, extending, or annulling the
sphere of operation of a norm of international law. 45 Such a conception sounds very similar to mutuality of consideration in American contract law.
The process of coordinating wills to reach agreement on the
formation of customary norms is only one aspect of the element of
43 Tunkin, supra note 7, at 34-35.
44Tunkin, supra note 37, at 10. The reader's attention is called to the influence

of ideology in Tunkin's legal analysis.
45Tunkin, supra note 7, at 35-36. Professor Tunkin is concerned at this point
with both the creation and termination of customary norms.
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agreement. Another is the content, that which must substantively
be agreed upon in order to create a customary norm. As Soviet
writers see it, states of diverse socio-economic systems recognize
that a norm which regulates their actions is binding upon them, not
because of morality, comity, or courtesy, but rather because it is a
rule of law. Norms have the force of law because states accept
them "with the intention of being bound by norms of law. "46 This
means that either implicitly or explicitly a state must agree to the
adoption of a customary norm as law. A state's agreement may be
expressed openly, as for example, when it publicly declares its
intention to be bound by a certain norm. Professor Tunkin cites as
illustrations Soviet declarations on prohibition of aggressive wars,
self-determination of nations, and peaceful coexistence. 47 A state
may also agree to a norm as law implicitly through its actions.
Soviet writers are quick to caution, though, that actions do not always "speak for themselves" and are subject to misinterpretation, a
situation calling for the exercise of great care among analysts.4 8
Since Soviet writers hold that customary norms result from
agreement among states, they are also led to conclude that a norm's
sphere of validity is limited to those states which recognize its
legal force. Consequently, customary norms of international law
may exist between as few as two states or between all states of the
international community. In the latter instance the norm is said
to be "universal." It is conceivable, therefore, that in the Soviet
view a norm of law may first appear as a norm of legal conduct
between a few states and then gradually expand through its acceptance by other states until it finally becomes a universal principle of
international law. 4 9 In this respect Tunkin writes:
The Soviet state has advanced the principle of banning agressive wars and treating such wars as crimes, the principle of selfdetermination of nations, the principle of peaceful coexistence,
and a number of other principles of international law. In all
these cases, the principles originally proclaimed by a single state
were gradually recognized by other states and have become,
partly by custom and partly by treaty, generally recognized
principles of modern international law. s°
46 TUNKIN, supra note 9, at 76. See also Tunkin, supra note 7, at 13. To support his
position, Tunkin cites Strupp, Regles Generales du Droit de la Paix [General Rules
of the Law of Peace], 47 RECUEIL DES CORs 306 (1934)

47TUNKIN,

supra note 9, at 76

4 Tunkin, supra note 7, at 12-13.
49Tunkin, supra note 7, at 14; and Tunkin, Remarks on the Judicial Nature of
Customary Norms of InternationalLaw, supra note 11, at 428.
50Tunkin, Remarks on the Judicial Nature of Customary Norms of International Law,
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Tunkin continues, "[o]nly a customary rule which is recognized
by the states of both systems can be regarded as a customary norm
of international law."5s

Does this mean that only the great powers in each camp must
recognize a particular norm in order for it to become universally
binding, or is it necessary for all states, great and small alike, to
give their consent? Tunkin suggests, in what he terms the "all
states doctrine," that for a given norm to become a universal rule of
international law it must be recognized by all states. 52 Over this
view, Tunkin has exchanged strong words with Professor Hans
Kelsen, a noted western international lawyer. For Kelsen, customary norms are not created by the "common consent of the members of the international community," but rather by "a long established practice of a great number of states, including the states
which, with respect to their power, their culture and so on, are of
certain importance." 3 In disputing this view Tunkin argues that:
It does not follow from the concept df agreement that all
states should participate in creating every specific customary
norm of international law. It is not necessary at all that "practice" should be universal.

A customary norm of international

law may be created by the practice of a limited number of states,
and in fact it may become first a customary norm with a limited
sphere of application. But to become a norm of international law
of universal application it should be recognized by all the
states.54

Continuing his argument in favor of the principle of the sovereign equality of all states, Tunkin added:
This concept [of Kelsen's] is in complete contradiction with
the

fundamental

universally

recognized

principles

of inter-

national law, and especially with the principle of equality of
states. There is no doubt that the attitude of the majority of
states, including states of both social systems, and especially
the position of great powers, is of primary importance in the
process of creation of universally recognized norms of international law. It is a factual situation. judicially, wills of different states in the process of creating norms of international law are equal. In international relations the majority of
supra note 11, at 428. This view of the evolution of universal norms of international
law lends itself well to Soviet claims of direct responsibility for positive developments in international law.
51 Id.
52 Tunkin, supra note 7, at 19-20.
53

H.

KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL

54 Tunkin, supra note 7, at 17-18.

LAW, 313 (1952).
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states cannot create norms binding upon other states; this is an
immediate consequence of the principle of sovereign equality of
55
states.
Tunkin's approach is legalistic; before the law, all nations, great
and small, are equal. Yet such a view must be compared with the
facts of international life. Is it in fact possible for the great powers
or a majority of the world community to.wield such influence as to
force a nation to subordinate its will to their own? It is not clear
whether Tunkin would recognize such po litic'al influence as actually
creating a legal obligation binding upon: the pressured nation or
whether, on the other hand, he would hold:no binding obligation by
virtue of coercion and duress. It is similarly unclear whether Tunkin's assessment of such a situation would hinge upon the ultimate
political question of which nation, or nations, was doing the influencing and which was being influenced. If Tunkin is entirely unwilling to admit some politics into the legal arena, it is difficult to see
how he might justify certain cases of Soviet influence, if indeed he
would attempt to justify them. On the other hand, if Tunkin's analysis does recognize some role for politics within international law,
his position would not appear that different from Kelsen's.56
By way of comparison, it is interesting to note that, like their
Soviet counterparts, many western scholars also believe that in addition to the practices of nations (the material element) there is a
second condition required for the creation of a customary legal
norm. While Soviet writers speak of "coordination of wills" and
the acceptance of norms by the various nations, western scholars
point to the psychological element of opinio juris sive necessitatis.
Opinio Juris may be defined as "a certain conviction of the judicial
necessity of the act in question."I Brierly speaks of recognition
by states of "a certain practice as obligatory." ' 8 Hudson requires
a conception by a nation that a given action was "enjoined by
law."5s
For Schwarzenberger, "it is necessary to prove that they
Id. at 19.
A similar question is raised when considering the issue of the "new" states
and "old" norms discussed later in this article.
55
56

57

SORENSEN, supra note 36, at 85.

BRIERLY, supra note 23, at 61. Earlier in the same work Brierly states, "Customary rule is observed not because it has been consented to but because it is believed to be binding." Id. at 52. This runs counter to the belief expressed by HACKENWORTH, supra note 36, at 1,that "Customary ... international law is based upon
the common consent of nations."
51 Manley 0. Hudson as quoted by H. BRIGGS, THE LAW OF NATIONS 47 (2d
ed. 1952).
58
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[nations] act in such a way because they admit a legal obligation
to act or refrain from acting in a certain manner."60 Oppenheim,
Wheaton, Higgins, and Kunz, 61 among others, adhere to the view
that it is the psychological element of opinio juris which differen62
tiates usage from custom.
NEW STATES AND OLD NORMS
Western scholars are in general agreement that the need to
maintain an ongoing system of world public order demands that
states be bound by rules of international law which were formed
prior to their statehood. 63 In the Soviet view, the issue of new
states and old norms of law is directly related to the question of the
sphere of validity of customary norms. Noting the reservation expressed by Professor Vendross that "although the formation of a
general customary norm does not imply its application by all states,
no general customary norm can appear that contradicts the legal
views of any civilized nation." 64 Professor Tunkin continues:
But if recognition of a new customary norm of international
law as such is required from an existing state, why must a newly
emerging state find itself in an inferior position? Why cannot
the new state object to any customary norm of international law
if [the new state] disagrees with it?
60G. SCHWARZENBERGER,

A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW 11

(2d ed. 1950).

61L. Oppenheim: "International jurists speak of custom when a clear and continuous habit of doing certain actions has grown up under the aegis of the conviction that these actions are, according to international law, obligatory or right," 1
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 25 (7th ed. 1948); Wheaton: " . . . it is usage de-

veloped into a rule which is adhered to in the belief that an obligation so to act
exists," supra note 23, vol. 1, at 10; Higgins: "Custom is more than mere international usage; it is a widespread practice which states engage in because they believe that the law requires it of them," supra note 23, at 141; and Kunz: "These
conditions are two: usage and opinio juris; they have equal importance," supra note
23, at 665.
however. See Kopelmanas,
12Not all western scholars accept opinio juris,
L. 127-151;
Custom as a Means of Creation of International Law, 1937 BRIT. Y.B. I/NT'L
KELSEN, supra note 53, at 262-266; and Guggenheim, Les Deux/ Elementes de la
Coutume en Droit International [The Two Elements of Customary International
Law], I LA TECHNIQUE ET LES PRINCIPLES Du DROIT PuBLIc, ETUDES EN LHONNEUR
DE GEORGE SCELLE 275-284 (Paris 1950).

63See Basdevant, supra note 27, at 515: "All agree that a new state is bound
by international law formed prior to the emergence of this state,"; Kelsen: "The
states are bound by general international law without and even against their will.
•. . It may be assumed that international law becomes applicable to a newly established community when the latter is recognized as a state by other states," supra
note 53, at 154; and Verdross: "International customary law is also binding upon
those states *which did not exist at the time of its inception," supra note 30, at 85.
64 VERDROSS, supra note 30, at 85.
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The concept that customary norms of international law, accepted as such by a large number of states, must be binding
upon all other states is actually based upon the presumption that
the majority of states is able in international 65relations to dictate
norms of international law to all other states.
From the Soviet viewpoint the process of creating a universal
norm of international law is never permanently accomplished. 66
All states of the international community may consent to a norm
as binding law, and at that moment the norm becomes a universal
norm of international law. But as soon as a new state is born, that
state acquires the same rights as the original states possessed when
they first created the binding universal norm, namely, the new
state may review the existing universal norm and decide whether
it wishes to be bound or not. To refuse to permit new states the
right of review would contradict "the basic generally recognized
principles of modern international law, the principle of equality of
states in particular. "67

Soviet
"right of
unlimited
of review
cise:

lawyers have not, however, espoused an unqualified
review."
Perhaps realizing the dangers inherent in an
right, Soviet spokesmen have circumscribed the right
by specifying the procedure to be followed in its exer-

As for the newly emerging states, they have the judicial right
not to recognize this or that customary norm of international
law. However, if a new state enters without reservation into
official relations with other states, this means that it recognizes
a certain body of principles and norms of existing international
law which constitute the basic principles of international relations .6

In the Soviet view, then, if a new state has entered into relations with the international community "without reservation," it
is assumed that that state has accepted the existing international
legal system, or at least its fundamental principles. A new state's
ability to review, therefore, is limited to the early period of its
existence. What substantive law gives, procedure takes away.
11Tunkin, Remarks on the Judicial Nature of Customary Norms of International Law,
supra note 11, at 427.
66This should not be confused with the fact that a particular state's acceptance of a principle is permanent in the sense that unilateral withdrawal of consent
is not permissible..
67 Tunkin, Remarks on the Judicial Nature of Customary Norms of International Law,
supra note 11, at 427.
68Id. at 428
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THE SOVIET VIEW OF THE UNITED NATIONS
CHARTER AS A SOURCE OF CUSTOMARY NORMS
In the Soviet view, the principles and norms of the UN Charter
acquire their binding legal force upon the signatories from the fact
that those signatories have explicitly manifested their assent
through a treaty, the Charter itself. The question then arises as to
what legal force these principles and norms have upon non-signatories such as Switzerland, North and South Korea, North and
South Vietnam, and East and West Germany.
In the case of
The Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex,69 the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) stated clearly the long
established principle that treaties cannot bind third parties without their consent. 0 Article 2, paragraph 6 of the United Nations
Charter reads:
The
bers of
ples so
national

Organization shall insure that states which are not memthe United Nations act in accordance with these Princifar as may be necessary to the maintenance of interpeace and security.

This provision of the Charter may express the will of the UN or
the desires of its members, but the question remains whether such
a provision can in fact create binding legal obligations for nonsignatories. If this sort of provision could give rise to legal obligations
for third party states, what effect would this have on the principles
of consent and state sovereignty to which Soviet writers subscribe?
Soviet scholars take the position that a provision, such as Article 2, paragraph 6 of the Charter, can never, in and of itself, create
obligations binding upon third parties. However, Soviet writers
do believe that the principles and norms expressed in the UN
Charter, taken as a whole, are so basic to inter-state relations that
the Charter occupies a special position and that consequently its
provisions and norms do bind non-signatories. "The UN Charter is not the usual treaty. In the first place, it is the legal basis
for the formation of a world wide international organization for
peace and security.
In the second place, states have given it
pre-eminence over all other treaties."7 These traits endow the UN
69 The Permanent
Court of International Justice (PCIJ) was the chief judicial organ of the League of Nations.
"0Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex [1932] P.C.I.J., set.
A/B, No. 46 at 96.
71Tunkin, supra note 37, at 8. See also Tunkin, supra note 7, at 22.
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Charter with a special character in the eyes of Soviet scholars.
Vladimir M. Koretskii, Soviet representative to the 1949 session
of the International Law Commission (ILC) observed, "the Charter of the United Nations . . .which laid down new principles
of international law, is essentially a treaty which has been signed
by all peace-loving nations in San Francisco."72 But it was also
something more than a treaty. In the words of Tunkin, a later
Soviet representative to the Commission, it was a source of customary norms, since "the new principles of the United Nations
Charter were binding on non-members as an expression of customary law."- 73 It was the unique character of the Charter itself,
and not the wording of any particular provision (Article 2, paragraph 6, for example) which gave the principles and norms of that
document their binding effect upon signatories and non-signatories
alike.
All of this is not to say that custom is seen as the source of the
principles and norms of the UN Charter which are binding upon
the Soviet Union. On the contrary, "the same norm of general
international law could be conventional [in origin] for some states
and customary for others."7 4 For the Soviets, the principles and
norms of the Charter are binding upon the USSR by virtue of its
being a signatory to the treaty. Those same principles and norms
are held to be binding upon non-signatories as a matter of custom.
Such an analysis is indicative of the Soviet view of the hierarchical importance of the sources of international law. If custom,
in the Soviet conception, had ranked higher than treaty as a source
of law, then Soviet writers would have concluded that for all states
(including the Soviet Union) the principles and norms of the Charter derived their legal force from custom. Instead, Soviet scholars
consider the Charter's norms and principles as treaty law for the
Soviet Union, in accordance with the higher Soviet valuation of
treaty over custom.
Such a viewpoint ought not be construed as implying that custom is of no consequence to the Soviet government so long as a
principle is codified in the Charter. On the contrary, custom
serves to fill gaps and explain how nonsignatories to a treaty
72 Koretskii, U.N. Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/SR32/13 (1949)
at 232 (emphasis added).
73Tunkin, U.N. Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/SR621/46 (1961)
at 258.
74Tunkin, U.N. Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, U.N. Doc. A/C.N. 4/SR794/47 (1965)
at 134.
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can be bound. This is not an inconsequential function. Moreover, treaties themselves have frequently been instrumental in
producing future customs. As Pavel I. Lunkin has noted, "many
international customary norms have resulted from international
treaties. "75 Treaties constitute a precedent, an element of practice, an expression of "coordinated wills." The daily acts of international organizations and of member-states may contribute to the
creation of customary norms. Tunkin has pointed out, "[i]t is
obvious that change in the Charter of an international organization by custom, i.e., by practice gaining recognition as a legal norm,
is possible only with the general agreement of member-states of
the international organization. '"76
Prior to 1945, the Soviet Union had accepted many of the
principles and norms presently contained in the UN Charter as
binding custom. Among these principles were sovereign equality
The subseof states, non-intervention, and self-determination.
quent codification of these customary norms into the Charters
does not preclude the future evolution of new customs through the
accumulated practices of states. 77 The process is a continuous
one. Furthermore, it is important to recognize that from 1917 to
1945, custom was the source of many of the international legal
principles accepted by the USSR. That period was a crucial one
in that nation's relations with the international community, and
custom played a prominent role in it.
75 LUNKIN,
76 Tunkin,

supra note 11, at 87.
supra note 37, at 9.

77 It has been the opinion of western writers that treaties and international conventions may become the basis of a rule of customary law. In 1844, Reddie, whose
treatment of the subject was astute, explained that a treaty stipulation may "by
subsequent imitation and adoption, without special stipulation . . . have become
a rule of common and consuetudinary international law." R. REDDIE, 1 RESEARCHES IN MARITIME INTERNATIONAL LAW 8 (Edinburgh 1844). In 1913, Alvarez
wrote of rules expressed in treaties that were later acknowledged by third states
as having "changed their nature, one can no longer consider them as conventional
but as customary." A. ALVAREZ, LA CODIFICATION Du DROIT INTERNATIONAL [The
Codification of International Law] 148 (Paris 1913). In the same year, Oppenheim
wrote of looking forward to the time when the Panama Canal shall have been in
use for such a length of time "as to call into existence - under the influence and
working of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty - a customary rule of international law according to which the Canal is permanently neutralized and open to vessels of all
nations." L. OPPENHEIM, PANAMA CANAL CONFLICT 46 (2d ed. 1913). In 1917, Roxburgh noted, "In practice, this process of extension of a conventional into a customary rule is not only possible but of very constant occurence." R. ROXBURGH,
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND THIRD STATES 75 (1917). In 1925, Kosters likewise noted, "Already in the conception of past centuries, the conclusion of a treaty
is an act which . . . can contribute to the formation of customary international law."
Kosters, Les Fondments du Droit des Gens [Foundations of International law] 4
BIBLIOTHECA VISSERIANA 221 (1925). In 1932, Derrying wrote, "Every treaty to
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SUMMARY
"There is a fairly close similarity," write the American international legal scholars Jan F. Triska and Robert M. Slusser, "between Soviet and western views on sources of order in interna"78
Treaties rank first and custom second as
tional relations ..
the only primary sources of international law. Custom is recognized by Soviet lawyers as an important source of legal norms,
notwithstanding its ranking below that of treaty. The principles of
international law which are custom-based are fundamental to the
international system. With the exception of the emphasis which
Soviet writers place on the element of agreements between states,
Soviet and western views are remarkably in accord as to the legal
One should
nature of the customary norm creation process.
recognize, of course, that there is wide disagreement among western scholars themselves over some aspects of custom.
The Soviet view of the legal nature of customary law may
be summarized in the following graphic form:
SOVIET VIEW OF THE LEGAL NATURE OF
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW SUMMARIZED

NECESSARY

ELEMENT
Practices among states
(both positive and negative)
Time
Repitition
Continuity
Agreements between states

*yes

ino

*yes
*yes

no
no

*yes
yes
no

Opinio juris

SUFFICIENT

no
yes
no
* Necessary in the usual case

some extent ...contributes to the formation and specification of rules of particular or common law." A.

DERRING,

THE

PRINCIPAL

TRENDS

OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE

LAW OF NATIONS IN THE LIGHT OF DECISIONS OF THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 39 (Lwow 1932). In 1957, Schwarzenberger described the "wide-

spread process of transforming of treaty law into international customary law."
G.

SCHWARZENBERGER,

1 INTERNATIONAL LAW 563 (London 1957). In 1966, Quincy

Wright speaking about the U.N. Charter wrote, "The Charter is more than a
treaty ...it gives the United Nations a universal competence to maintain peace,
thus going far toward making the principle of Article 2 universal international
law." Wright, Custom As a Basis for International Law in thePost War Period, 2 TEX.

INT'L L. F. 143, 149 (1966).
The question of the binding effect of resolutions of the United Nations General
Assembly is recognized but not considered in depth in the present article.
71 Triska and Slusser, Treaties and Other Sources of Order in International Relations:
The Soviet View. 52 AM. 1. INT'L L. 726 (1958).

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. 7:148

Agreement between states is the essential element for the creation and termination of customary law from the Soviet point of
view. First, Soviet lawyers view the element of agreement as adding a measure of certainty to traditional western notions of customary law. A nation which agrees to be bound by a customary
norm has some notice of the nature and scope of its obligations.
Uncertainty has always been a feature of customary law which
Soviet writers have found distasteful. Second, Soviet diplomats
view the element of agreement as containing political advantages
for the Soviet Union. Soviet policy-makers may choose which
norms will bind them and which will not.
It is fair to ask at this juncture whether the element of agreement has, in fact, contributed to the lessening of uncertainty or
provided the Soviet Foreign Ministry with real political benefits.
Is customary law today more certain because of the Soviet position? Do the Soviets really obtain political advantages in the
world of inter-state relations through their preference for explicitly agreeing or not agreeing to a customary norm? In practice, only
little impact has resulted from Soviet and western disagreement on
the issue of whether agreement is the essential element for the creation or termination of a customary norm. A measure of uncertainty remains inherent in unwritten customs. Similarly, the Soviet
Union has agreed to adhere to the great majority of traditional customary norms. The actual degree to which Soviets have come to
accept particular principles of customary international law must
79
be the subject of another article.
7
For a discussion of the degree of acceptance of customary principles of
international law, see ERICKSON, supra note 3.

